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LEE-FORD AND HIS CLIENT

Lee-Ford is a tax practitioner. He graduated at the top of his class from
law school and the subsequent LL.M. program he attended. He has been
preparing estate plans for over fifteen years and has devoted his practice
exclusively to wills, trusts, and estates. Today, he ushers his client, Mr.
Panos, into his office. Panos has asked Lee-Ford to craft a detailed estate
plan for the assets that Panos wants divided among his family members.
After hearing Panos's desires for the disposition of his property, Lee-Ford
begins to discuss the corresponding tax implications. Lee-Ford explains
various tax reduction strategies and devaluation techniques that could
minimize the tax liability for Panos and his beneficiaries.
Then, Panos tells Lee-Ford that he holds stock options that are on the
verge of appreciating, in light of an upcoming IPO. Based on his
experience with irrevocable trusts, Lee-Ford believes he can minimize the
tax liability for Panos's stock options by placing them in a grantor retained
annuity trust (GRAT), with the proceeds passing to Panos's beneficiaries.
Lee-Ford explains the basic premise of the GRAT to Panos, who is pleased
to hear that the GRAT will significantly reduce the amount of estate and
gift taxes owed.
Amidst Panos's enthusiasm at the prospect of reducing the taxes on his
stock options, Lee-Ford becomes troubled by the fact that certain tax
strategies have recently obtained patents. Lee-Ford has dedicated his
career to estate planning and taxation, not intellectual property law and
patent infringement. However, these historically distinct areas of the law
will inevitably clash as the prospect of tax patent infringement becomes a
realistic concern for tax practitioners. Based on this concern, Lee-Ford is
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struck with the tax practitioner's dilemma: he now must navigate the
murky waters of intellectual property laws while performing the same
estate planning services he has provided for years. Although Lee-Ford
knows that tax strategies are patentable, he questions their validity and
whether he or his client could be liable for patent infringement for
establishing a GRAT that he has been using for years.
Although the situation described above is fictional, tax strategies are
now patentable and their presence has rattled some attorneys. Tax
attorneys are unsure how new developments in patent law will affect their
practice.' This Note explores the origin and emergence of tax patents that
affect estate planning and examines a potential double standard for
attorney and client stemming from attorney-advised patent infringement
of a valid tax patent.2
Part II explores the origin of patent laws and the policy goals that
served as the catalyst for early patent laws. Part 1H discusses the seminal
case, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature FinancialGroup,' that
sounded the death knell for the business method exception to patentable

1. For further discussion of this growing concern among tax practitioners, see Floyd Norris,
You Can't Use That Tax Idea. It's Patented,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 2006, at Cl (discussing the
newfound possibility of patent infringement suits stemming from the use of tax strategies and the
increased costs and confusion that tax patents could generate for tax attorneys or accountants).
2. This Note will focus primarily on the "SOGRAT patent," a structure-based tax patent.
See U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed May 20, 2003). This Note will not focus on computer-based
tax programs or software that make references to "estate plans" as possible functions that the
computer programs could be of assistance or use, but do not attempt to patent structure-based tax
strategies. As of September 5, 2008, a search of the USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Base,
availableat http://patft.uspto.gov/, only returned three patents that contain the term "estate plan."
The three patents returned were all examples of computer-based tax patents that will not be the
focus of this Note, and merely reference "estate plans" as potential areas where the patented
computer program can be of assistance or use. See U.S. Patent 6,684,190 (filed Jan. 27, 2004)
(patented as "a computer apparatus and method for exposing risk inherent in various financial plans
using dynamic graphs and displays ... [and] provide an apparatus and method, concerning an estate
plan, that provides a display of estate assets in the order of their liquidity and which can show their
consumption upon death of the estate owner in accordance with estate taxes."); see also U.S. Patent
6,430,542 (filed Aug. 6, 2002) (patented as "a computer-implemented program for a financial
planning and advice system, and more particularly, ... a computer-implemented program to assist
financial advisors in performing financial simulations and other tasks for clients and prospective
clients."); U.S. Patent No. 5,819,230 (filed Oct. 6, 1998) (patented as "[a] computer and
communications system" that "concerns a set of data processing system and financial accounts that
support a multifaceted financial program, or set of products, that are designed to improve the
financial return on the homebuyer's investment in a home and provide other 'estate plan'
elements.").
3. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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subject matter, and thus opened the door for tax patents. Part IV analyzes
the "SOGRAT patent," a structure-based tax patent that was filed in 2003.4
Part V suggests grounds for challenging and potentially invalidating the
SOGRAT patent along with potential legislative responses to the
SOGRAT patent and its progeny of structure-based tax patents. Part VI
focuses on potential ethical issues stemming from tax patents and
introduces a presumption for attorney-advised patent infringement
malpractice claims that could prevent a thorny double standard for the
liable client and the advising attorney.

H1.

PATENT LAW

A. Origins and Policy
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to enact patent laws.5
Section 8 of Article 1 grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."6 More specifically, patents are protected under the U.S.
Patent Act (the Act).' The Act confers upon a patent holder, typically the
inventor,' the right to prevent others from making, using, offering to sell,
or selling within the United States, or importing into the United States, the
patented item for a period of twenty years from the date the patent
application is filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).'
The Act grants a patent holder a monopoly for a specified amount of time
4. This Note analyzes the SOGRAT patent specifically, with the assumption that the
concepts and issues discussed could be applicable to other structure-based tax patents that are not
expressly mentioned in this Note.

5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Section 8. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States.
Id.
6. Id.
7. See U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
8. See id. § 261 (establishing that patents shall have the attributes of personal property, and
thus, allowing applications for patents, or any interest therein, to be assignable in law by an
instrument in writing).
9. See id.§ 154.
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and allows a patent holder to recover the costs of an invention and
potentially generate a profit.'o In the absence of this protection, inventors
would be stifled by the fear that years of labor and costs would be wasted
as soon as a fellow inventor replicated the invention and sold it a lower
price." When the patent expires, the invention enters the public domain
and fellow inventors or companies may produce the formerly patented
invention.1 2
B. Process
The Act created three classes of patents: utility, plant, and design
patents." The Act only entitles the first inventor to a patent if the
necessary statutory requirements are satisfied.14 The first inventor must file
a patent application that "contains a specification that so completely
describes the invention that a skilled artisan is . . . [able] to practice it

without undue experimentation ... [and] distinct, definite claims [exist]

10. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS 2 (2d ed. 2004).
The more common theory, and the one most clearly reflected in the Constitution,
is that patents provide the encouragement necessary for industrial advancement.
For instance, a budding Edison who feared that the rewards ofhis inventive efforts
would be reaped by another, perhaps with greater power or resources, might
abandon the laboratory for other pursuits.
Id.
11. See id.
12. See id. Durham estimates that as of 2004, four million patents have expired and entered
into the public domain, becoming "a resource that may be freely exploited by anyone," and
providing inspiration for new inventions or technological approaches to formerly patented
inventions. Id.
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 161, 171. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id. § 101.
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new
variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found
seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated
state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.
Id. § 161. "Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id. § 171.
14. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND AND ISSUES RELATING TO THE PATENTING
OF TAX ADVICE 12 (2006) (JCX-31-06) [hereinafter JCT Report].
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that set out the proprietary interest asserted by the inventor."s Section 101
of the Act establishes four patentable subject matters: process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.' 6 The USPTO's Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure explains that the first category defines "actions,"
while the latter three categories define "things" or "products."" The
Supreme Court noted that "Congress plainly contemplated that the patent
laws would be given wide scope""s and that Congress chose the broad
language of section 101 to encompass "anything under the sun that is made
by man"" as patentable subject matter.
Courts with patent subject matter jurisdiction have found three
exceptions to the scope of section 101: abstract ideas, laws of nature, and
natural phenomena.20 Accordingly, an inventor may not patent abstract
ideas (including mathematical formulas or algorithms), laws of nature, or
natural phenomena standing alone. However, an inventor may obtain a
patent if any of the exclusions are used to recite a particular machine or
transform an article.2 ' If an invention falls within the scope of patentable

15. Id. at 8.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
17. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2106 PATENT SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBIITY 7 (8th ed. 2007).
18. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980). "In choosing such expansive
terms as 'manufacture' and 'composition of matter,' modified by the comprehensive 'any,'
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope." Id. (Internal
citations omitted).
19. Id. at 309.
20. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187-88 (1981).
This Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not
embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent protection are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson,409 U.S. 63, (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). "An idea of itself is not
patentable;" Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874). "A principle,
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right;" Le Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853).
Id. (Internal citations reformatted for consistency).
21. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reaffirming the machine-ortransformation test and abrogating In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994), which had
determined the validity of a patent if the claimed process produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible
result").
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subject matter, the invention must also be useful, 2 2 novel,23 and
nonobvious. 24 For an invention to be "useful," the invention must have
some "identifiable benefit"25 or "serve a beneficial end."26 For an invention
to be "novel," the invention must "differ[] from existing references that
disclose the state of the art, such as publications and other patents." 27 For
an invention to be "nonobvious," the subject matter of the invention as a
whole could not have been obvious, at the time of invention, to a person
skilled in the art.2 8 Once issued, a patent enjoys a statutorily conferred
presumption of validity throughout the patent term.29

III. THE DEATH KNELL OF THE "BUSINESS

METHOD" EXCEPTION

A. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group
Traditionally, the USPTO rejected business method patents as outside
the scope of patentable subject matter.30 Courts summarily invalidated
patents that claimed a method of doing business, without further
examining the requirements of patentability set forth in sections 102, 103,

22. 35 U.S.C § 101.
23. 35 U.S.C § 102 (2002).
24. 35 U.S.C § 103 (2004).
25. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999). "The
threshold of utility is not high: An invention is "useful" under section 101 if it is capable of
providing some identifiable benefit." Id.
26. Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274,275 (7th Cir. 1903). "Does the opposing evidence, the grant
itself being prima facie proof of utility, go to the extent of establishing not merely that the device
has been used for pernicious purposes, but that it is incapable of serving any beneficial end?" Id.
27. JCT Report, supra note 14, at 9.
28. Graham v. John Deere Co. ofKan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966) (invalidating a plow clamp
patent and a sprayer patent because both inventions were obvious, and would be evident to one of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art).
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 282. "A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether
in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of
the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even
though dependent upon an invalid claim." See also Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Lab., 293
U.S. 1, 7 (1934). "A patent regularly issued, and even more obviously a patent issued after a
hearing of all the rival claimants, is presumed to be valid until the presumption has been overcome
by convincing evidence of error."
30. See CRAIG J. MADSON, Patents, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK 239
(William A. Finkelstein & James R. Sims III eds., 2005).
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and 122 of the Act.3 ' Courts expressed concern that business method
patents were unpatentable because they represented abstract ideas or
mathematical algorithms that were not considered "useful."3 2 However, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that business methods
were patentable in the seminal case, State Street.3 The State Street court
held that new and useful business methods were patentable subject matter
if the "invention" involved a process within section 101.34 State Street
Bank held that business method patents should not be per se excluded from
patent prosecution because they were business methods.3 ' Rather, the
invention should be evaluated on the same terms proscribed in section 101
as any other invention submitted to the USPTO.'
The Federal Circuit abrogated the business method exception in 1998."
It reversed a lower court decision to grant summary judgment to State
Street Bank & Trust Co. (State Street Bank), invalidating U.S. Patent No.
5,193,056 ('056 patent) on the ground that the claimed subject matter was
not encompassed in section 101.38 The '056 patent was entitled "Data
Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration"
and was issued to Signature Financial Group, Inc. (Signature) on March
9, 1993." The State Street court described the '056 patent as "a data
processing system for implementing an investment structure which . . .
relates generally to a system that allows an administrator to monitor and
record financial information flow and make all calculations necessary for
maintaining a partner fund financial services configuration." The State
Street Bank attempted to license Signature's patented accounting system
described in the '056 patent.4 When negotiations for the licensing
agreement failed, the State Street Bank brought a declaratory judgment
against Signature, asserting that the '056 patent was invalid and
unenforceable based on a failure to claim a patentable statutory subject

31. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (citing In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting)).
32. Id. at 1373.
33. Id. at 1375.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1370.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1370-71.
41. Id. at 1370.
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matter under section 101.42 The State Street Bank then filed a motion for
partial summary judgment. The lower court granted the motion and the
appeal followed.43
On appeal, the issue was whether the '056 patent was invalid for failing
to fall within the statutory subject matter of section 101." The lower court
had concluded the '056 patent fell into one of two judicially created
exceptions to statutory subject matter: either the mathematical algorithm
exception or the business method exception.4 5 Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit analyzed both exceptions to patentable subject matter, beginning
with the mathematical algorithm exception.4 6
At the onset, the State Street court acknowledged that the Supreme
Court had identified three categories of unpatentable subject matter: laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.4 7 It noted that
mathematical algorithms had been held unpatentable to the extent that they
represented abstract ideas.4 8 The State Street Bank court relied on the
Supreme Court's analysis in Diamond v. Diehr, to explain that
mathematical algorithms standing alone represented abstract ideas
constituting "disembodied concepts or truths that are not 'useful."' 4 9
However, it distinguished unpatentable mathematical algorithms from
mathematical algorithms used to produce "a useful, concrete and tangible
result.""o The State Street court held that the application of a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation to a set of data that transforms the data
into "useful, concrete and tangible result" is a practical application of an
abstract idea, and thus eludes the mathematical algorithm exception."
Therefore, it concluded that the accounting software claimed in the '056
patent, although relying on mathematical algorithms, produced a "useful,

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1372.
46. Id. at 1373.
47. Id. (citing Diehr,450 U.S. at 185).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citingAllapat, 33 F.3d at 1544).
51. Id. The court further explained: "However, after Diehr and Alappat, the mere fact that
a claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and
storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory subject matter, unless, of course,
its operation does not produce a 'useful, concrete and tangible result."' Id. at 1374 (citing Allapat,
33 F.3d at 1544).
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concrete and tangible result" and fell within a valid statutory subject
matter.5 2
The State Street court next analyzed the business method exception to
patentable subject matter and seized the "opportunity to lay this illconceived exception to rest."" It effectively invalidated the business
method exception by explaining that the exception was "no longer [an]
applicable legal principle"54 and that the exception had "nothing to do with
whether what is claimed [in the '056 patent] is statutory subject matter." 5
In renouncing the business method exception, the State Street court held
that a claimed patent's validity should be determined by the statutory
subject matter pursuant to section 101, and not by whether the claimed
patent was a method for doing business. 5 6 However, the Federal Circuit
only ruled that the '056 patent was not an invalid subject matter, failing to
address whether the '056 patent met the additional requirements for
patentability, including novelty and nonobviousness.s? Limiting its review
to the '056 patent's subject matter, the State Street court repudiated the
business method exception to patentability that the lower court had relied
on to grant partial summary judgment. The court then remanded the case
to the lower court to determine whether the '056 patent had satisfied the
additional statutory requirements."
B. The Constrictionof State Street Bank: In re Bilski
The Federal Circuit redefined the boundaries of the State Street Bank
decision on October 30, 2008, when it addressed the standard for
determining the patentability of a claimed process under section 101." In
re Bilski reached the Federal Circuit on appeal from the final decision of
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board), which had

52. Id. at 1375; see alsoAT'T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1360-61 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (reiterating the court's decision in State Street and holding that a patent for a three-step
method indicating a telephone call recipient's primary interexchange carrier as data field in
standard message record was not merely an abstract idea; rather, the patent's method claims were
within the broad statutory scope ofpatentable subject under § 101 and produced a "usefil, concrete
and tangible result.").
53. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1377.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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sustained the examiner's rejection of the applicants' eleven claims.'
Although the applicants argued that the examiner erroneously rejected
their claims as not patentable subject matter under section 101, the Bilski
court concluded that the claims were not patentable subject matter. In
doing so, the court clarified the standards for determining whether a
claimed method constituted a patentable statutory "process" under section
101.61

On April 10, 1997, the applicants filed their patent application, which
in essence, was a method of hedging risk in commodities trading.62
Initially, the examiner rejected the claim and the Board upheld the
rejection,'6 stating that the transformation of "non-physical financial risks
and legal liabilities of the commodity provider, the consumer, and the
market participants" was not patentable subject matter.' On appeal, the
Federal Circuit held that the applicant's claims were not directed to a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, and thus, must involve
a process.6 ' The underlying legal question presented to the Bilski court was
60. See id. at 949.
6 1. Id.
62. Id. The court explained:
[C]oal power plants (i.e., the "consumers") purchase coal to produce electricity
and are averse to the risk of a spike in demand for coal since such a spike would
increase the price and their costs. Conversely, coal mining companies (i.e., the
"market participants") are averse to the risk of a sudden drop in demand for coal
since such a drop would reduce their sales and depress prices. The claimed method
envisions an intermediary, the "commodity provider," that sells coal to the power
plants at a fixed price, thus isolating the.power plants from the possibility of a
spike in demand increasing the price of coal above the fixed price. The same
provider buys coal from mining companies at a second fixed price, thereby
isolating the mining companies from the possibility that a drop in demand would
lower prices below that fixed price. And the provider has thus hedged its risk; if
demand and prices skyrocket, it has sold coal at a disadvantageous price but has
bought coal at an advantageous price, and vice versa if demand and prices fall.
Importantly, however, the claim is not limited to transactions involving actual
commodities, and the application discloses that the recited transactions may
simply involve options, i.e., rights to purchase or sell the commodity at a
particular price within a particular timeframe.
Id. at 949-50.
63. See id. at 950. The Board upheld the examiner's decision, but held that the examiner
erred to the extent that he relied on a "technological arts" test, as such a test was not supported by
case law. Id.
64. Id. at 950.
65. See id. at 951.
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"what test or set of criteria governs the determination by the Patent and
Trademark Office or courts as to whether a claim to a process is patentable
under section 101 . . ."6
The Bilski court held that the "machine-or-transformation" test, as
enunciated by the Supreme Court, was the definitive test to determine
whether a process was patentable under section 101.67 It stated that "a
claimed process is surely patent-eligible under section 101 if (1) it is tied
to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article
into a different state or thing."' In reaffirming the Supreme Court's
machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit abrogated the "useful,
concrete, and tangible result" language associated with State Street, as first
set forth in Alappat.69 However, the Bilski court noted that business
method claims were not categorically rejected and were "subject to the
same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process
or method." 0
The Bilski court elaborated that the proper inquiry under section 101
was whether the claimed process meets the machine-or-transformation
test, and therefore the claimed process must recite a particular machine or
transform any article into a different state or thing." The analysis is a twobranched inquiry into the claimed process to determine whether the claim
is tied to a particular machine or transforms an article.72 "First ... the use
of a specific machine or transformation of an article must impose
meaningful limits on the claim's scope to impart patent eligibility. Second,
the involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process
must not merely be insignificant extra-solution activity.""
Since the applicants' claim was not a machine, but rather an alleged
transformation, the Bilski court reviewed case law to "gain insight into the
transformation part of the test."7 4 It acknowledged that claimed processes
for chemical or physical transformation of physical objects or substances
were patentable transformative processes, and proceeded to review
"information-age processes . . . and electronically-manipulated data." 75

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 952.
Id. at 954.
See id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
See id. at 959 (citing State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373).
See id.at 960 (citing State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375-76).
See id.at 961.
See id.
See id. at 961-62 (citation omitted).
See id. at 962.
See id.
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Although the Bilski court found no reason to expand the boundaries of
patentable transformations of articles, it failed to add much insight to the
determination ofpatentable transformations, choosing instead to reference
processes that were not patentable." The Bilski court's enlightenment-byelimination approach detailed various processes that were unpatentable,
including: steps of deriving data for an algorithm," a method of
conducting an auction of multiple items that maximized the total price of
all items," and a method of diagnosing the location of a malfunction in a
multi-component system, where each component had an assigned
numerical value that could be assessed to determine the precise location
of any malfunction." While the Bilski court's review of unpatentable
transformative processes highlighted unpatentable processes, it also added
insight without forcing the court to confine itself to a rigid formulation for
future processes under review. Ultimately, the Bilski court held that the
applicants' process for hedging risk in commodities trading "plainly"
failed the machine-or-transformation test and reaffirmed the standard to
apply to future claimed processes under section 101 "
C. The Impact of State Street Bank and In re Bilski
The State Street decision effectively enlarged the range of patentable
subject matter by abrogating the business method exception and
reemphasizing the basic statutory requirements of a patent: usefulness,
novelty, and nonobviousness." Although Bilski abrogated the test for
section 101 patentability relied upon in State Street, Bilski upheld the
validity of business method patents and reaffirmed the machine-ortransformation test as the proper standard for the patentability of a
"process" under section 101.82 Since the State Street decision, the concept
of business method patents has been stretched to cover an ever-increasing
range of processes including healthcare management systems, resource
allocation methods, inventory methods, credit and risk processing systems,
and most notably, tax patents."

76. See id.
77. See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
78. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 291 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
79. See In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 792-93. (C.C.P.A. 1982).
80. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 965-66.
81. See id. at 959-60.
82. Id.
83. See Mackenzie Dismore, IntellectualProperty'sNewest Invention, the Tax Patent:Has
PatentProtectionExtended Beyond its ConstitutionalLimits?, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
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The complex permutations and calculations claimed in many tax
patents relay on quick and accurate calculations that only modem
computers can perform. Thus, these tax strategies were not considered
when the initial patent laws were drafted and such technology was
nonexistent.8 To that end, as technology advanced, mathematical
algorithms and abstract ideas finally had the means to produce "useful,
concrete and tangible results," and inventors began seeking patents under
the language of State Street."s Accordingly, tax patents frequently
implement computer-based methods that rely on pre-determined
parameters signaling equally pre-determined reactions to market
fluctuations or changing monetary amounts."
Alternatively, other tax patents rely on the tax structure itself, as
codified by the Internal Revenue Code.87 These structure-based patents
involve applications of tax strategies and legal concepts designed to
minimize tax liability." Although the USPTO has issued multiple
structure-based tax patents, the language of Bilski seems to undermine the
ongoing validity ofthese structure-based tax patents under the machine-ortransformation test.89 Subsequent courts will have to determine whether
structure-based tax patents transform an article into a different state or
thing when minimizing tax liability within the boundaries of the Internal
Revenue Code, a standard that patent holders may not be able to satisfy.
However, no tax patents have been judicially challenged under the

287, 293-95 (2007) (discussing the expansion of business method patents since the State Street
decision (citing U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Class 705 Definition (June 30, 2000))).
84. Compare U.S. CONST. art. VII ("Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the
states present the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred
and eighty seven (1787) and of the independence of the United States of America the twelfth."),
with JOEL N. SHURKIN, ENGINES OF THE MIND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER FROM
MAINFRAMES TO MICROPROCESSORS 142-43 (1996) (explaining that M.H.A. Newman's electronic
decoding machine, called COLOSSUS, was invented in 1943 and "[b]y any standards ... was a
working electronic computer, perhaps the world's first."). Although the date of the "first computer"
is highly debatable, the U.S. Constitution was signed in 1787, long before any computers had been
invented. For a point of reference, in 1787, the "new technology" was James Rumsey's steampowered boat, which ran successfully for two hours on the Potomac River, averaging a respectable
three miles per hour. See A Short History of Steam Engines, http://www.steamboats.com/
museum/enginerooml.html (last visited on Sept. 26, 2008).
85. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
86. See JCT Report, supranote 14, at 19; see also supra note 2.
87. See JCT Report, supranote 14, at 19-20.
88. See id.
89. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954-67 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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machine-or-transformation standard, and for the moment, tax patents
maintain their statutory presumption of validity.
The most-well known example of a structure-based tax patent is U.S.
Patent No. 6,657,790, which describes a stock option grantor retained
annuity trust (SOGRAT patent)."o The SOGRAT patent was issued to
Wealth Transfer Group, L.L.C. (Wealth Transfer) on May 20, 2003,"
qualifying under State Street's broad classification of business method
patents.
IV. THE SOGRAT PATENT (NO. 6,567,790)
The SOGRAT patent was initially issued as a business method patent,
and later reclassified as a tax patent by the USPTO. 92 The SOGRAT patent
details a grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT) funded by nonqualified
stock options. 93 The method is used to maximize the transfer of wealth
from the grantor of the GRAT to the family members of the grantor's

90. See U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed May 20, 2003) [hereinafter '790 Patent].
91. See id.
92. Telephone interview with Robert Slane, Wealth Transfer Group, LLC, in Maitland, Fla.
(Sept. 18, 2008).
93. See '790 Patent, supra note 90. The abstract of the patent states:
An estate planning method for minimizing transfer tax liability with respect to the
transfer of the value of stock options from a holder of stock options to a family
member of the holder. The method comprises establishing a Grantor Retained
Annuity Trust (GRAT) funded with nonqualified stock options. The method
maximizes the transfer of wealth from the grantor of the GRAT to a family
member by minimizing the amount of estate and gift taxes paid. By placing the
options outside the grantor's estate, the method takes advantage of the
appreciation of the options in said GRAT. In one embodiment the method also
maximizes the amount transferred to the family member by keeping as many of
the options as possible in the GRAT until immediately prior to the termination of
the GRAT, when the grantor substitutes an equivalent value of assets into the
GRAT for the remaining options, and then exercises the options. The method is
used for evaluation purposes in establishing the GRAT, and responds to a variety
of grantor-selected options. An Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust (ILIT) may also
be established to provide life insurance should the grantor die before the
termination of the GRAT. If the GRAT continues until its natural termination date
the ILIT will receive the assets of said GRAT and may purchase further life
insurance on the grantor.
Id.

162

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20

choice while minimizing tax liability.94 The GRAT is established as an
irrevocable trust for a specified amount of time and funded by the
grantor's nonqualified stock options." The grantor transfers the
nonqualified stock options into the GRAT, outside of the grantor's control,
under the assumption that the stock options will appreciate in value during
the term of the GRAT." The grantor is then able to deduct the value of the
grantor's retained annuity, minimizing the tax liability to the
beneficiaries." The GRAT technique is commonly used in estate planning
because the grantor has the ability to transfer the appreciation on the assets
that fund the trust at little or no gift tax cost.98
After the USPTO issued the SOGRAT patent, it lay dormant until
January 6, 2006, when Wealth Transfer filed suit against Dr. John W.
Rowe, the Executive Chairman of Aetna, Inc. for patent infringement."
The case was filed in district court and settled before the issue of the
patent's validity could be litigated.'" In the settlement the parties
stipulated that (1) the SOGRAT patent was presumed to be valid, (2) there
were facts from which a trier of fact could conclude that the SOGRAT
patent was valid and enforceable, and (3) the parties resolved their
differences without the admission of liability by either party.'0 ' Since the
settlement agreement precluded a judicial determination of the SOGRAT
patent's validity, the SOGRAT patent retains a statutory presumption of
validity.
V. WILL SOGRAT SURVIVE?

A. Is SOGRAT Not So Valid?
Once issued a patent maintains a presumption of validity, however its
validity may be challenged in court. Although Dr. Rowe alleged that the
SOGRAT patent was invalid and unenforceable, the parties settled before

94. See id
95. See Barry L. Grossman & William C. Weinsheimer, Patenting Estate Planning
Techniques: A Patently Difficult Issue, 22 No. 3 PRAc. TAX LAW 37, 46-47 (2008).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Consent Final Judgment Regarding Settlement Agreement at 1,Wealth Transfer Group,
L.L.C. v. John W. Rowe, No.3:06CV0024 (D. Conn. 2007).
101. See id. at 1-2.
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a judicial decision could be rendered.'o2 However, this does not imply that
the SOGRAT patent is inoculated against future challenges. A suit could
proceed through litigation and result in a verdict holding the SOGRAT
patent invalid. A challenge to the SOGRAT patent could be premised on
any of the patent's basic statutory requirements that the patented invention
must be a patentable process,' useful,'0 4 novel, 0 5 and nonobvious.os
1. Is SOGRAT Not So Transformative?
Akin to the method for hedging commodities described in Bilski,
structure-based tax patents will also be analyzed as "process claims" under
the machine-or-transformation test. The inquiry will focus on whether the
tax patent claim "transforms" an article into a different state or thing.'
Although the Federal Circuit only referenced existing case law to
determine the boundaries of the machine-or-transformation test, portions
of the opinion appear to critically undermine the patentability of structurebased tax patents as transformative processes.'
The cardinal inquiry of SOGRAT would involve the debatably
"transformative" aspect of the process. Although SOGRAT "creates" a
specific grantor-retained annuity trust for the aim of reducing tax
liability,1 0 9 it is unclear if this "creation" will constitute a transformation
of an article into a different state or thing. The Bilski court explained that
"transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal
obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions
cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or
substances."'"
SOGRAT, and most structure-based tax patents, may be viewed as
"transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal
obligations," which the Bilski court specifically invalidated as patentable
subject matter."' In essence, SOGRAT works within the statutory
"obligations" established by the Internal Revenue Code to reduce tax

102. See id.
103. 35 U.S.C.

§ 101; see also Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.

104.
105.
106.
107.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2007).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2007).
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. at 963-64.
See Grossam & Weinsheimer, supranote 95, at 46-47.
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963.
Id.
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liability, or an individual's "legal obligation" to the government, a
transformation deemed insufficient by Bilski. Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit clarified that "a claimed process wherein all of the process steps
may be performed entirely in the human mind is obviously not tied to any
machine and does not transform any article into a different state or
thing."ll 2 The process steps of SOGRAT, a specific series of claims used
to create a trust, may be deemed a series of steps or processes "performed
entirely in the human mind," and therefore unpatentable by Bilski.
Although SOGRAT is still presumptively valid, the Bilski decision
markedly weakened the foundation supporting the patentability of
SOGRAT as a patentable subject matter.
2. Is SOGRAT Not So Useful?
The term "useful" is not explicitly defined in the Act, but in Juicy Whip
Inc. v. Orange Bang Inc., the Federal Circuit explained that for an
invention to be "useful," the invention must have some "identifiable
benefit."l 3 In Juicy Whip, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court's
holding invalidating a patent on the ground that the purpose of the patented
invention was to increase sales by deception.114 The Federal Circuit began
by restating Justice Story's opinion in Lowell v. Lewis,"s that inventions
which are "injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of
society"" 6 are unpatentable." 7 The Juicy Whip court qualified its statement
by explaining that the principle of invalidating patents designed to serve
immoral and illogical purposes had not been applied broadly in years."'
The court reasoned that a patent, which could be used in a deceptive
manner, was not per se invalid." 9 Utility could be found in the patented
invention's ability to imitate another, possibly more expensive invention,
such as cubic zirconium.'2 0 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit (1) held that an
invention with the capability to fool members of the general public did not
112. Id. at 961 n.26.
113. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
114. Id. at 1366. The patented invention was a post-mix beverage dispenser that was designed
to look like a pre-mix beverage dispenser. Id. at 1365. The patent claims require that the post-mix
create the perception that the bowl is the primary source of the dispensed beverage, although the
beverage is mixed immediately before it is dispensed, as in conventional post-mix dispensers. Id.
115. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
116. Id.
117. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366.
118. See id. at 1366-67.
119. Id. at 1367.
120. Id.
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lack utility, (2) noted that Congress was free to declare inventions
unpatentable, and (3) explained that the statutory "utility" requirement was
not a directive to the USPTO or to the courts to serve as arbiters of

deceptive trade practices.121
The Juicy Whip decision found that inventions with potentially
deceptive purposes were not per se unpatentable, but did not repudiate the
concept of invalidating patents designed to serve immoral or illogical
purposes.122 Implicit in Juicy Whip is the concept that a patent is merely a
collection of rights excluding others from using an invention, not the
mutually independent legal right to use a patented invention. 123 Juicy Whip
also indicates that the utility requirement of a patent may be satisfied even
if the patent only benefits one party, the patent holder, to the detriment of
other parties.124 Therefore, a tax patent may satisfy the statutory utility
requirement if the patent only benefits the patent holder in minimizing tax
liability, to the detriment of the federal government. The fact that the
USPTO has granted structure-based tax patents has no bearing on whether
the patented tax strategies run contrary to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) regulations or whether the patented tax strategies are of any useful
application.'2 5 The judgment of a patented invention's utility is merely the
determination of a patent examiner, working independently of the IRS and
other governmental entities.12 6
Accordingly, the "utility" of a structure-based tax patent is susceptible
to challenge, but may not reach the perils that Justice Story described as
"injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society." 27
The issue at the heart of the utility argument turns on the public policy
interpretations associated with tax patents. If an individual's goal is to
reduce tax liability and effectively limit the money an individual pays to
the government, than the patented tax strategy may be deemed highly
useful. However, the underlying purpose of federal taxation is to generate
revenue for the federal government,128 and therefore any patents that
thwart this purpose could be deemed lacking the beneficial end required
by Juicy Whip. The interpretation of a tax patent's utility is subject to each
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
Revenue

Id. at 1367-68.
Id. at 1366-67.
See JCT Report, supra note 14, at 11.
See id.
See id. at 12.
See id.
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice: Hearing Before the Subconun. On Select
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2006).
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individual's interpretation of the role of taxes and tax regulation, and will
likely engender more questions regarding the policy concerns behind
federal taxes themselves than the policy concerns behind tax patents.129
Thus, the issue of utility, although a proper challenge to a tax patent's
validity, is a questionable challenge to any structure-based tax patent due
to the various interpretations that individuals hold for taxes and tax
regulation. These interpretations may color the judgment of whether a
patent for the explicit purpose of minimizing tax liability has an
identifiable benefit. As Judge Learned Hand noted, "there is nothing
sinister in arranging one's affairs to keep taxes as low as possible.
Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any
public duty to pay more than the law demands. . .""0
3. Is SOGRAT Not So Novel?
The statutory requirement of "novelty" states that "[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless (a) the invention was known or used by others
in this country . . . or described in a printed publication . . . before the

invention thereof by the applicant or (b) the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public
use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent. . . .""'To determine whether a patented invention

was "known or used by others," a court reviews the "prior art" in the field
of the claimed invention to determine whether the invention was "known
or used by others before the invention thereof by the applicant,"l32 or
whether the invention was disclosed to the public in a "printed
publication" more than one year prior to the patent application."' The term
"known" is interpreted as "publicly known" and the invention must "differ
from existing references that disclose the state of the art, such as
publications and other patents." 34 Thus, if there has not been prior

129. For a more detailed discussion analyzing whether tax patents run contrary to public policy
and the purpose behind the Patent Act, see Dismore, supra note 83, at 297-302.
130. Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).

131. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b).
132. See 35 U.S.C.

§ 102(a); see also Arminak & Assoc., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc.,

501 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
133. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also Frantz Mfg. Co. v. Phenix Mfg. Co., 457 F.2d 314, 320
(7th Cir. 1972).
134. See JCT Report, supra note 14, at 6.

2009]

WHAT'S SO GREATABOUT SOGRAT?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ETHICAL ISSUES CREA TED

167

disclosure or known use of the invention, an invention satisfies the novelty
requirement of patentability.'
Courts have construed the term "prior disclosures" broadly in an
attempt to secure protection for the inventor and encourage public
disclosure of inventions.' 6 The Federal Circuit has held that the
determination of whether a given reference is a "printed publication"
depends on whether the reference was publicly accessible during the prior
period.' 7 Furthermore, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures states
that a reference is deemed a "printed publication" "upon a satisfactory
showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made
available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the
subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.""' For
example, a poster displayed at an industry event that was not disseminated
or indexed constituted a "printed publication" because the poster's primary
purpose was to convey public information.139 Alternatively, a confidential
document disseminated within an organization is not considered prior art,
and is insufficient to satisfy the "public access" requirement." A printed
publication describing an invention more than one year before the date of
the patent application will render the disclosed invention unpatentable due
to a lack of novelty.' 4 '
The SOGRAT patent and other structure-based tax patents could be
invalidated for lacking statutorily required novelty based on prior
disclosures in printed publications. The SOGRAT patent allows the patent
holder to establish a GRAT for the patent holder's client, the grantor.
However, the basic structure and requirements of a GRAT can be found
in the Internal Revenue Code'4 2 and explained by various examples in the
135.
136.
137.
138.
ART (8th
139.
140.

Id. at 9-10.
See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMININGPROCEDURES § 2128 "PRINTED PUBLICATION" AS PRIOR
ed. 2007) (quoting Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226).
See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
See JCT Report, supra note 14, at 10 (citing MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURES § 2128 "PRINTED PUBLICATION" AS PRIOR ART, supra note 138).
141. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2007); see also Sampson v. Ampex Corp., 333 F. Supp. 59, 62
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court invalidated a patent of an educational tool combining a tape recorder
and slide projector because the invention was described in a printed publication more than one year
prior to the date of the patent application. Id. at 60. In its opinion, the court analyzed the limitation
established in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) to invalidate the patented invention on the ground that it failed
to satisfy the novelty requirement. Id. at 62.
142. I.R.C. § 2702 (2008). Section 2702, titled Special Valuation rules in case oftransfers of
interest in trust, states:
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treasury regulations detailing the formation of a GRAT through an
irrevocable trust.'43 Moreover, various taxation textbooks and estate
planning practitioners' manuals educate students on the formation and
finding options of a GRAT.'"
At least one district court has used a collegiate textbook in its analysis
of the novelty of a patented invention.'4 5 In Network Appliance, Inc. v.
Bluearc Corp. the district court was presented with an allegation of
infringement of three patents relating to network file server architecture
and operating system software.'" One of the elements of patentability that
the NetworkAppliance court reviewed was the novelty of the inventions.147
The parties identified two passages from a textbook describing "distributed
(a) Valuation rules.- (1) In general.-Solely for purposes of determining whether
a transfer of an interest in trust to (or for the benefit of) a member of the
transferor's family is a gift (and the value of such transfer), the value of any
interest in such trust retained by the transferor or any applicable family
member ....
Id.
143. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(d) (2008).
144. See, e.g., ALAN S. HALPERIN ET AL., MANNING ON ESTATE PLANNING § 7:4 (5th ed.
1998). Manning devotes an entire subchapter to GrantorTrusts with RetainedPayments and details
the formation and funding of a GRAT, along with various permutations to the basic GRAT
structure. See id. In 1998, the year of the State Street decision, and five years before the USPTO
issued the SOGRAT patent to the Wealth Transfer Group, Manning explained:
A technique that was inspired by the boom in valuation of the life estate was the
grantor retained income trust ... The usual transaction was that the client created
a trust, which was irrevocable and unamendable ... These familiar starting points
may no longer be employed when a trust interest is transferred to a member of the
family because of legislation, which demands that the retained interest be a
qualified interest in order to deserve respect for gift tax purposes. A pure income
right has no value for gift tax purposes. An annual payment equal to a fixed
percentage of fair market value ofthe trust property is revalued from year to year.
So we have an annuity, either fixed or variable. That led to an alteration of the
acronym. Good-bye, GRIT (grantor retained income trust); hello, GRAT (grantor
retained annuity trust) . . .

Id. at 7.9. Manning further explains that a GRAT may be very appealing for a client who may have
stock options or holds assets in a closely held business or S corporation. Id. at 7.19-7.20.
145. See Network Appliance, Inc. v. Bluearc Corp., 374 F. Supp. 2d 825, 830 (N.D. Cal.
2005). The first prior art reference the court examined was a textbook written by George F.
Coulouris and Jean Dollimore and published in 1988. FINK DECL., ExH. D, GEORGE F. CoULOURIs
& JEAN DoLuMORE, DistributedSystems: Concepts and Designs (1988).
146. Network Appliance, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
147. Id. at 830.
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systems" as relevant prior art for the issues of novelty and
nonobviousness.' 4 8 The Network Appliance court found that the textbook
was too general to preclude patentability on the grounds of novelty,
explaining that the textbook taught a number of distributed systems and
only provided a general description of the patented operating system.14 9 It
explained "[w]hile both of these disclosures may of course be weighed in
considering whether the prior art renders the patent's claims obvious, it is
generally inappropriate to combine such distinct teachings for the purpose
of determining the novelty of a patented invention, even though they may
be encompassed within a single prior art reference.""5o
The Network Appliance decision implicitly created a balancing test for
subsequent courts to determine whether a specific textbook's teachings
were similar enough to a patented invention's limitations to preclude
patentability for lack of novelty."' Furthermore, the Network Appliance
court explained that the various references throughout the textbook could
not be examined in the aggregate; the textbook reference had to be
specific, not a series of passages that collectively addressed the distinct
limitations of the patented invention.'5 2 Although not persuaded that the
textbook described the patented invention with enough specificity due to
the highly technical nature of the patented software and distributing
system, the Network Appliance court accepted the textbooks as prior art to
consider when determining novelty.'5 3
Network Appliance allows for use of textbooks to establish prior art,
with the limitation that a court must find a specific reference to the
patented invention, and not an aggregate ofpages, references, or examples.
Applied to the SOGRAT patent, various descriptions of GRAT formations
can be found in estate taxation textbooks and estate planning manuals,
along with the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations.' 5 4
Whether the descriptions are specific enough to preclude the novelty of the
SOGRAT patent will be an issue for future courts to examine if the
SOGRAT patent is challenged for a lack of novelty.
Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations,
textbooks and practitioners' manuals will serve as the cardinal, if not the
148. Id.
149. Id. at 836.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 837.
153. Id. at 838.
154. Seesupranotes 129-30 (citing various references to the formation ofa GRAT and options
of funding the corpus of a GRAT).
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only, prior art references that a court reviews, based on the shroud of
confidentiality that surrounds estate planning. Tax returns are generally
kept confidential,"' and communications between tax attorneys and clients
are privileged.'"' There is a lack of precedent analyzing the interplay of the
confidentiality provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the novelty
requirement for tax patents. The Internal Revenue Code provisions foster
the confidentiality of estate plans and tax strategies,1 7 as opposed to patent
laws, which encourage disclosure and public access of inventions."' The
only "disclosure" that a tax attorney may make while preparing an estate
plan is the "disclosure" to the IRS when the tax attorney files the
paperwork required to effectuate the estate plan. For example, with a
GRAT (or SOGRAT), a tax attorney must file the necessary forms to
establish, fund, and record the irrevocable trust with the IRS. Therefore,
because of the confidentiality and secrecy shrouding estate planning, tax
attorneys face the difficult task of establishing that their prior use of a
strategy similar to the SOGRAT patent was "publicly accessible."
Accordingly, the most effective challenges to the novelty of the
SOGRAT patent will rely on prior art found in the Internal Revenue Code,
Treasury Regulations, taxation textbooks or estate planning practitioners'
manuals. If a court is persuaded that a particular section, explanation, or
example is specific enough to describe the limitations of the SOGRAT
patent, the patent could be invalidated for a lack of novelty. Ultimately,
this determination will be left to the discretion of a federal court presented
with a challenge to the validity of the SOGRAT patent, with the outcome
possibly affecting all structure-based tax patents that have their roots in
textbooks or practitioners' manuals.

155. See I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2008). "Returns and return information shall be confidential, and
except as authorized by this title . . ." Id.
156. See I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2008).
With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality
which apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also
apply to a communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax
practitioner to the extent the communication would be considered a privileged
communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney.
Id.
157. See id.
158. See 35 U.S.C.

§ 102 (2007); JCT Report, supra note 14, at 21.
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4. Is SOGRAT Not So Obvious?
The statutory requirement for nonobviousness is that the invention be
"beyond the ordinary abilities of a skilled artisan knowledgeable in the
field."" However, there is a dearth of precedent defining "ordinary skill
in the art," and courts must perform a difficult factual examination in each
case." A common question in the determination of nonobviousness is
whether the invention would have been obvious to a skilled artisan in the
field. This question is difficult, as hindsight might unduly influence the
answer. 161
In KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court clarified
the standard that federal courts should apply when determining the
nonobviousness of a patented invention. 62 Telefex, the holder of a patent
that described a mechanism for combining an electronic sensor with an
adjustable automobile pedal, alleged that KSR had infringed upon its
patent by merely adding an electronic sensor to one of KSR's previously
designed pedals.6 6 KSR countered that Telefex's patent was invalid under
the Act because its subject matter was obvious.'" The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of KSR after applying the framework
from Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City.1s The court of appeals
reversed the lower court's holding which failed to strictly apply the TSM
test. '66The court of appeals explained that the lower court failed to make
the required findings that would establish a specific understanding or
principle within a skilled artisan's knowledge that would have motivated
an artisan, without prior knowledge of the invention, to attach an
159. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2007).
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter (a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
160.
(2004).
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See

ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN

R. THOMAs,

PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW

See JCT Report, supra note 14, at 10.
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1746 (2007).
Id. at 1734.
Id.
Id. at 1738.
Id.
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electronic sensor to a portion of the pedal.'1 7 Because the Supreme Court
believed that "the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals addressed the question of
obviousness in a manner contrary to [section] 103 and our precedents," it
granted certiorari review.'
The Court began by rejecting the court of appeal's rigid approach to the
Graham test to determine obviousness."' The Court emphasized that the
focus of the inquiry was not whether the combination of prior art was
obvious to the patent holder, but whether the combination was obvious to
a person with ordinary skill in the art.' The Court went on to clarify the
standard for determining obviousness based on a combination of prior art,
stating that "[o]ne of the ways in which a patent's subject matter can be
proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a
known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by
the patent's claims."' 7 ' Ultimately, the Court reversed and remanded the
case to the court of appeals.172 In its conclusion, the Court opined that as
science and art progress, simple innovations are not subject to the
exclusivity granted by patent laws, otherwise Congress would stifle rather
than promote the progress of useful arts."'
The KRS v. Teleflex decision is instructive to a federal court presented
with an obviousness challenge to a patent issued by the USPTO.174 The
decision indicates that patents based on a combination of prior art will be
more difficult to enforce in federal courts."' A reliance on the analysis of
KRS v. Teleflex will be the linchpin of any compelling challenge to the
SOGRAT patent and other structure-based tax patents that may arguably
be "an obvious solution" to a person with ordinary skill in the art.
Assuming a fellow tax attorney would be considered a person with
ordinary skill in the art, the SOGRAT patent could be deemed an obvious
solution to the issue of minimizing tax liability for a top-level executive
with nonqualified stock options. The argument will be predicated on the
knowledge of an ordinary tax attorney, including prior art found in the
Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations, taxation textbooks or estate
planning practitioners' manuals that tax attorneys rely on for guidance.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. at 1735.
Id. at 1739.
Id. at 1742.
Id. at 1742.
Id. at 1746.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Furthermore, the SOGRAT patent is a specific variation on a GRAT
described in the Internal Revenue Code that becomes more specific by
delineating the funding source, nonqualified stock options. Ultimately, if
the SOGRAT patent's obviousness is challenged, a court will determine
whether there was an apparent reason to combine the specifications in the
fashion claimed by the SOGRAT patent by looking to (1) the interrelated
teachings of multiple patents; (2) a combination of prior art known to a
person having ordinary skill in the art; and (3) the background knowledge
possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art.
B. Is a CongressionalRemedy Looming?
Although a federal court may invalidate the SOGRAT patent, "[t]he
definition of 'patentable subject matter' begins with legislation,"l 76 and
Congress may intervene before any federal court ever hears the issue.
Various legislators and state bar associations have demonstrated an interest
in regulating tax patents, ranging from a full prohibition of tax patents, to
a limitation of remedies available to tax patent holders for infringement."
One example of a full prohibition of tax patents, supported by then Senator
Barack Obama, was Senator Carl Levin's "Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act"
(S.681) that was introduced on February 17, 2007. This proposal would
deny patentability to any invention "designed to minimize, avoid, defer,
or otherwise affect the liability for Federal, State, local, or foreign tax."178
On March 5, 2007, a month after Senator Levin introduced the "Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act," the Colorado Bar Association wrote Senator Levin to
express its support of the act.' 79
An alternative to a full prohibition of tax patents would be a limitation
on the infringement liability of tax patents. On January 26, 2007, the State
Bar of Texas passed a resolution in favor of congressional intervention that
would eliminate infringement liability of taxpayers and tax practitioners
for patents that have the "effect of reducing, minimizing or deferring a

176. Douglas L. Youmans, Tax Patents, 8 (2007) (discussing a proposal for review by the
State Bar of California, Taxation Section) (citing Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
109th Cong. (2006) (Statement of James Toupin, general counsel of the PTO)).
177. See ControversyContinuesfor Tax Patents,106 J. TAX'N379, 380-81 (2007) (discussing
the validity of tax patents and noting various legislative responses to tax patents that may occur
before a federal court decides the issue).
178. See id. at 380.
179. See id.
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taxpayer's tax liability."' 8 0 Whether a senator or state bar association takes
the initiative, any proposal would ultimately require an act by Congress.
However, there is precedent for both prohibiting tax patents and
limiting infringement liability.'8 ' Congress could prohibit all present and
prospective tax patents, much like it prohibited patents for inventions that
are "useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic
energy in an atomic weapon." 82 Alternatively, Congress could limit
infringement liability or remedies available for patent holders, similar to
the "Physicians Immunity Statute," which protects medical practitioners
from infringement actions for performing a patented "medical or surgical
procedure."'
However, the necessity of a statute immunizing tax attorneys and tax
practitioners from infringement liability poses strong questions as to the
enforceability and utility of tax patents in the wake of a statute limiting
their exclusionary rights. Moreover, if Congress does not take any action,
it is difficult to imagine many situations where infringement of tax patents
could be alleged; communications between clients and tax attorneys are
privileged, with the only disclosure being made to the IRS in most estate
planning situations. Robert Slane, the inventor of the SOGRAT patent,
retains a firm to review SEC filings to detect potential infringers, based on
the transfer of large amounts of nonqualified stock options.'8 Absent the
ability to monitor publicly available SEC filings, locating potential
infringers may prove more difficult for the patent holder than obtaining a
tax patent in the first place.
VI. POTENTIAL ETHICAL AND MALPRACTICE ISSUES FOR
TAx ATTORNEYS
Unfortunately, any discussion of the ethical issues surrounding tax
patents for attorneys yields far more questions than answers. While the

180. See id (citing Texas State Bar PassesResolution on Patents of Tax PlanningMethods,
2007 TNT 39-43).
181. Youmans, supra note 176, at 8 (further analyzing potential actions from Congress,
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, and USPTO regulatory or procedural reforms).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2007).
183. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2007); see also Youmans, supranote 176, at 8 (further analyzing
potential actions from Congress, amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, and USPTO regulatory
or procedural reforms).
184. See Rachel Emma Silverman, The PatentedTaxShelter-Lawyers, FinancialAdvisorsAre
Getting Exclusive Rights to Estate-PlanningStrategies,WALL ST. J., June 24, 2004, at Dl.
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Model Code of Professional Conduct provides guidance for attorneys,
judicial interpretation is the best expression of the rules' applications and
limitations. As there is a lack of precedent adjudicating the validity of tax
patents, there has been a corresponding lack of precedent adjudicating
ethical issues surrounding tax patents. To that extent, the following section
is intended to illuminate the various ethical issues that may arise for tax
attorneys and demonstrate the inconsistent results for both client and
attorney that tax patents may create when carried to their logical ends.
A. EthicalIssuesfor Tax Attorneys Who Obtain Tax Patents
For the few structure-based tax patent holders that are attorneys, the
primary ethical issue is the potential conflict of interest created by
dispensing estate planning advice and holding a patent for a structurebased tax strategy. The ABA Model Rules bar any representation that
involves a conflict of interest, explaining that "if the probity of a lawyer's
own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or
impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice."'" Accordingly,
the patent holder may encounter situations where it becomes challenging
to give detached advice in light of self-interests.
The first potential conflict could arise when a sophisticated client
desires to utilize a tax strategy in an estate plan contrary to the patent
holder's strategy. Could the patent holder assist the client without
encouraging the client to use the patented tax strategy? Moreover, if the
client expresses a desire to utilize an estate planning method that is very
similar to the patent holder's patent, could the patent holder provide
detached advice and not encourage the use of the patent holder's method
instead? Would the attorney have a self-fulfilling desire to utilize the
attorney's own technique to the exclusion of other strategies? Would the
attorney prevent the client from seeking alternative representation by
threatening an infringement suit if another attorney utilized an estate
planning strategy similar to the patented strategy?
Although these questions are speculative at best, the standard provided
by the Model Rules will require a court to perform a highly factual inquiry
into whether the attorney gave "detached advice" to the client.'8 6 A court
will have to examine the advice that the attorney provided in light of
alternative strategies that the attorney failed to discuss, determining

185. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CNDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2006).
18 6. Id.
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whether the attorney's interest in utilizing the patented tax strategy
precluded the attorney from providing detached advice.
Alternatively, in the absence of a patent, a tax attorney planning an
estate will still have various factors that may prohibit the attorney from
providing "detached advice." If a tax attorney has become accustomed to
a particular method that the attorney finds quite useful, that attorney will
typically, if not subconsciously, gravitate toward that method when
devising estate plans. It is human nature to choose a familiar alternative
that can be utilized more effectively than less familiar alternatives.
Whether this alternative is an unpatented GRAT that an attorney has been
utilizing for years or is the SOGRAT may make little difference. An
attorney's tendency or subconscious choice to favor a particular method
can be entirely independent of whether that attorney holds a patent, and
may simply be the product of years of experience that have fostered a
certain level of comfort. Accordingly, the presence of tax patents will only
add a slight wrinkle, if any, to the judicial determination of whether the
attorney provided "detached advice."
B. EthicalIssuesfor Non-PatentHolding Tax Attorneys
1. Issues for Tax Attorneys with Knowledge of the SOGRAT Patent
Returning to Lee-Ford's dilemma,"' the decision to use a GRAT raises
uncertainties even for the seasoned tax attorney. Lee-Ford advised Panos,
the client, of the basic structure of a GRAT, and now his client is eager to
create a GRAT to minimize tax liability. However, Lee-Ford has
knowledge of the SOGRAT patent and is unsure whether he must disclose
the SOGRAT patent to his client. Is Lee-Ford's GRAT similar enough to
the SOGRAT patent to require disclosure? Can Lee-Ford provide his client
with an alternative that will not infringe upon the SOGRAT patent, thus
avoiding disclosure of the SOGRAT patent? Ultimately, what level of
disclosure will a tax attorney need to provide to clients to prevent legal
malpractice and ensure clients are reasonably informed?
Legal malpractice standards vary by state, but the basic elements are
similar. Florida's legal malpractice standards serve as a representative
model herein. The elements of a legal malpractice claim in Florida are: (1)
the attorney's employment; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty;
and (3) that the attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of loss to

187. See supra Introduction: The Practitioner's Dilemma.
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the client.' The issue of malpractice can arise in many situations
involving tax patents for tax attorneys who are aware of the patents. The
attorney's liability will turn on a court's interpretation of an attorney's
"reasonable duty" in light of the emergence of tax patents. The new
dilemmas created by tax patents may force a court to apply a generic
standard of a "reasonable duty" to the nuanced intersection of patent
infringement and legal malpractice.
The Model Rules require an attorney to "keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter"' to the extent that the client has
"sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning
Although the interpretation of
the objectives of representation."'
"reasonably informed" has been subject to highly factual inquiries, there
is no precedent detailing the information a client should be informed of
regarding a patented tax strategy. Is an attorney's decision to not mention
the SOGRAT patent to a client with nonqualified stock options tantamount
to malpractice even if the attorney prepares an alternative solution that the
client finds desirable? Possibly not, if the clients still made a "reasonably
informed" decision in light of the attorney's failure to disclose the
SOGRAT patent.
Disclosure issues can easily be avoided by full divulgence of
information. However, anything short of full disclosure creates questions
for tax attorneys who may have knowledge of the SOGRAT patent and do
not want to advise the client about the patent for various justifications.
Some tax attorneys may avoid disclosure of the SOGRAT patent as a silent
objection to the patentability of tax strategies or in the attempt to avoid
paying license fees to the patent holder."' In the absence of judicial
interpretation, the duty of an attorney to inform a client of a tax patent
remains unclear as to whether a "reasonably informed" client should know
of a patented tax strategy, or whether an attorney may avoid disclosure.
The failure to disclose may also be an ethical violation. However, an
alleged ethical violation alone is insufficient to state a cause of action for
legal malpractice.' 92 Malpractice requires that the client demonstrate that
the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty was the proximate cause of the

188. See Law Office of David J. Stem, P.A. v. Sec. Nat'1 Servicing Corp., 969 So. 2d 962,966

(Fla. 2007).
189.
190.
191.
192.

MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3).
MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4. cmt [5].
See discussion infra Part VI.C.
See Rios v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 613 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
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client's loss.' Ultimately, a tax attorney who decides to not inform the
client of the SOGRAT patent, or other structured-based tax patents, may
face allegations of malpractice if the failure to disclose results in a loss to
the client, assessed by comparing the reduction in tax liability between the
patented tax strategy and the alternate strategy advised by the attorney.
The accused attorney may rebut any malpractice claims stemming from a
lack of disclosure if: (1) the attorney demonstrates that the attorney did not
believe that the client's situation was similar enough to the SOGRAT
patent to warrant disclosure; (2) the attorney provided alternate strategies
to assist the client that obtained a similar or more favorable tax benefit; or
(3) the attorney performed an internal cost-benefit analysis and took a
calculated risk to not discuss patent infringement issues with the client,
believing the issue of infringement was not likely to affect the client. The
aforementioned examples may provide the basis of an attorney's defense
to a malpractice claim, but it is far from certain if they will exonerate
attorneys from such a claim.
Any legal malpractice claim will be predicated on the underlying claim
that the attorney failed to make a disclosure as required by the applicable
ethical rules. The Florida Supreme Court, applying the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct, held that an attorney failed to keep a client
"reasonably informed" of the status of representation by failing to explain
a specific matter, to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make an informed decision.'9 4 Although the case involved a divorce
proceeding, the case represents an expression of the Florida Supreme
Court's standard to determine whether a client is reasonably informed by
determining whether the failure to disclose precluded the client from
making an informed decision.195 However, determining whether the client
had the necessary information to make an informed decision in an estate
planning situation is a highly factual question that will turn on the details
of the transaction at issue and the sophistication of the client.
Due to the variety of questions presented by a failure to disclose the
SOGRAT patent or similar structure-based tax patents, a claim of legal
malpractice in estate planning must involve an intensive case-by-case
factual inquiry determining whether the attorney disclosed sufficient
information necessary for the client to make an informed decision as to the
disposition of the client's property. A bright line rule would be too rigid

193. See Law Office of David J. Stem, P.A. v. Sec. Nat'1 Servicing Corp., 969 So. 2d 962,966
(Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
194. See Fla. Bar v. Roberts, 770 So. 2d 1207, 1207-09 (Fla. 2000).
195. See id.
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to apply to the wide array of attomey-client relationships and would fail
to acknowledge the various levels of sophistication that clients possess and
the various desires expressed by clients for the disposition of their assets.
Some clients may defer entirely to their tax attorney's advice, while other
clients may provide input and recommendations to supplement their
attorney's advice. A more pliable rule would allow judicial case-by-case
analysis to determine whether the attorney was justified in failing to
disclose a valid tax patent to the client. Therefore, determination of
"reasonably informed" should be made on a case-by-case basis to account
for the desires of individual clients and the situations presented to
individual attorneys, allowing the court to exercise its discretionary
powers.
2. Issues for Tax Attorneys Without Knowledge of the SOGRAT Patent
After debating whether to disclose the SOGRAT patent to Panos, LeeFord decides to pursue another method for his client's estate. However, the
SOGRAT patent has made Lee-Ford wary and left him wondering what
other estate planning strategies are patented. Lee-Ford is now fearful of
unknowingly infringing upon a patented tax strategy while establishing an
estate plan for Panos. Will Lee-Ford need to search the USPTO for tax
patents before dispensing any tax advice? If so, what level of research will
Lee-Ford need to perform to satisfy his "reasonable duty" as an attorney?
Most concerning to Lee-Ford, what will happen if he fails to discover a
valid tax patent and his client is subsequently accused of patent
infringement?
Patent infringement is the unauthorized making, using, or selling of the
claims of a patent.' Any of the following actions may constitute patent
infringement: a tax attorney's advice to a client to engage in a patented
strategy; a client's use of a patented tax strategy; or a client's tax return
that reflects a patented tax strategy.'9 7 Patent holders who are successful
in a claim of patent infringement may be awarded injunctions and
damages, even if the infringer (the client) lacked any knowledge of the
patent.' Liability for infringement extends to anyone who actively
induces infringement, and this may include tax attorneys, accountants, and
financial advisors who assist client in preparing estate plans and tax

196. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003).
197. See Youmans, supra note 176, at 3-4.
198. See id. at 4 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283).
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returns.'99 However, the Federal Circuit has held that '"[i]n order to
succeed on a claim of inducement, the patentee must show, first that there
has been direct infringement,' and 'second, that the alleged infringer
knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to
encourage another's infringement."' 20 0 As one commentator explained,
"[g]iven the current 'low' level of knowledge among tax advisors of the
scope of tax patents and patent protection, an interpretation that requires
actual knowledge could limit application of inducement liability." 20 1
Although it is possible that tax attorneys themselves may be liable for
inducement if the requisite knowledge of the tax patent can be sufficiently
established, this section will focus on a scenario where a tax attorney fails
to discover a tax patent and unknowingly advises the client to utilize a
patented tax strategy.
Ifthe patent holder subsequently brings an infringement suit against the
client, the tax attorney may be able to hide behind a shield of ignorance,
while the client takes the brunt of the liability and faces a patent
infringement suit for following the advice of counsel. The patent holder
would be unable to prevail on a claim against the tax attorney based on the
attorney's lack of knowledge, precluding an allegation that the attorney
actively induced infringement or had the specific intent to encourage
another's inducement. This would leave the client as the sole infringer
based on the client's implementation of the attorney's infringing advice.
Thus, an otherwise innocent client may be hauled into court as a defendant
for following the advice of counsel, with legal malpractice against the tax
attorney being the client's only recourse. However, the standards for
determining patent infringement and legal malpractice vary, potentially
yielding different results when applied to the same situation.
The determination of patent infringement involves a two-step analysis.
"[F]irst, the meaning of the claim language is construed, then the facts are
applied to determine if the accused device falls within the scope of the
claims as interpreted."20 2 After construing the claims, the second step
requires a determination that "'the accused device meets each claim
limitation, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.' Literal
199. See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)).
200. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1304-05 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
201. See Youmans, supra note 176, at 4.
202. MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), af'd,
517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
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infringement of a claim in a patent exists 'when each of the claim
limitations reads on, or in other words is found in, the accused device."' 2 03
If a device does not literally infringe, it may still infringe "under the
doctrine of equivalents if it (1) performs substantially the same function,
(2) in substantially the same way, and (3) achieves substantially the same
result as the allegedly infringed claim.",204
Whereas patent infringement is determined by analyzing whether the
device falls within the scope of the claims of the patent, legal malpractice
is determined by establishing whether the accused attorney's neglect of a
reasonable duty was the proximate cause of a loss to the client.205 In a
malpractice claim, the client bears the burden of establishing the attorney's
neglect of a "reasonable duty." However, Florida courts are silent on the
issue of an attorney's "reasonable duty" with respect to a patent
infringement or patent prosecution issue.206 In the absence of precedent, it
is unclear what a tax attorney's "reasonable duty" will entail when dealing
with structure-based tax patents. This may frustrate the burden placed
upon the client of proving the attorney's neglect of that reasonable duty.
Carried to their logical ends, these standards may yield different results
for attorneys who provide infringing advice and clients who follow the
advice. The dynamic of the attorney-client relationship may infringe upon
a tax patent on two levels. Initially, the attorney's tax advice unknowingly
induces infringement. Secondly, the client (implementing the attorney's
advice) directly infringes upon the existing tax patent. However, without
the requisite level of knowledge or intent to induce infringement, the
attorney may not be held liable for patent infringement, and the patent
holder may only have a valid claim against the client for infringement. As
a result of this potential inconsistency (assuming the client cannot
establish that the attorney neglected a reasonable duty by failing to locate
the tax patent), the attorney may be insulated from both patent
infringement liability and legal malpractice. Thus, the only logically
consistent approach requires a strict liability standard to ensure that the

203. Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 384 F. Supp. 2d 176, 184-85 (D.D.C. 2005)
(citations omitted).
204. Id. at 185.
205. See supra text accompanying note 168.
206. The sole Florida case discussing legal malpractice with respect to an allegation of patent
infringement addressed the issue of the commencement of the limitations period for bringing a
malpractice suit, and not the attorney's reasonable duty. See TSE Indus., Inc. v. Larson & Larson,
P.A., 987 So. 2d 687, 690-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
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attorney be held liable for legal malpractice if the tax attorney advises a
client to infringe upon an existing tax patent. 207
Although draconian, strict liability represents the theoretically
consistent result and remedies the troublesome double standard created by
the juxtaposition of the elements of patent infringement and legal
malpractice. A lesser standard would expose a client to patent
infringement liability and potentially shield a tax attorney from
malpractice due to the different standards applied to patent infringement
claims and legal malpractice claims.
Under a strict liability theory of malpractice for attorney-advised patent
infringement, liability would attach to the attorney when a court renders
a judgment of infringement against the innocent client for following a tax
strategy that the attorney advised.2 08 In Florida, "no cause of action for
legal malpractice 'should be deemed to have accrued until the existence of
redressable harm has been established."' 209 Accordingly, the adverse patent
infringement judgment would be the "redressable harm" required to
initiate a subsequent claim against the attorney for legal malpractice.
After judgment is rendered against the client for following the advice
of counsel, the client would recover the costs of the litigation and the cost
of the judgment by filing a legal malpractice claim against the attorney.
The client would have the burden of establishing that the client followed
the tax attorney's advice and did not deviate from the advice in any
manner. Under this scenario, the attorney would no longer be insulated
from liability. The judgment against the client and the attorney's fees
incurred in the patent infringement litigation would be assessed against the
attorney once the client files a claim of legal malpractice and establishes
that the client followed the advice of counsel. This scenario would help the
client avoid a financial loss as a result of following the advice of counsel,
ensuring that the client recover the damages incurred.

207. The Florida Supreme Court explained that "strict liability should be imposed only when
a product the manufacturer places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 86-87 (Fla. 1976). Although the Florida Supreme Court has restricted
the imposition of strict liability to "products," an attorney's tax advice is a "product," to the extent
that materials prepared by the attorney are commonly referred to as "work-product." Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947). However, this comparison of "products" has a stronger
foundation in theory than practice.
208. This scenario assumes that the client, much like the attorney, had no knowledge of the
tax patent.
209. See Hold v. Manzini, 736 So. 2d 138, 141-42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (internal citation
omitted).
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Under the alternative outcome to the patent infringement litigation,
attorneys escape liability if the patent holder fails to sufficiently establish
that the estate plan or tax strategy infringed upon the tax patent, or a court
finds that the attorney's estate plan differed from the patented tax strategy.
Therefore, the attorney would be exonerated from a legal malpractice
claim, and the client would not be liable for an adverse judgment. While
the client will have incurred attorney's fees as a result of the litigation,
these fees can be recovered under 35 U.S.C. § 285, allowing a court to
award attorneys fees to the prevailing party in a patent case.210 Under both
outcomes to the patent infringement litigation the client has been forced
to divert time from other ventures to defend against a patent infringement
suit, but neither scenario forces the client to incur financial losses for
following the advice of the client's attorney. The interplay between strict
liability and a court's ability to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party
ensures that a client following the advice of counsel will not be liable for
(1) an adverse judgment rendered against the client or (2) the attorney's
fees incurred in the successful defense of a patent infringement claim.
a. A Patently Strict Dilemma
To avoid an inequitable double standard for the client and the attorney,
logic compels a strict liability standard for legal malpractice claims
involving attorney-advised infringement. However, reality compels a less
rigid formula. Although strict liability theoretically prohibits an
inconsistent standard, strict liability: (1) binds the attorney to the decision
of a patent infringement case that the attorney is not a party to, (2) has a
chilling effect on settlements, (3) creates a perverse incentive for the client
to receive ajudgment ofpatent infringement to recover costs and fees from
the tax attorney, and (4) ignores the legal fees associated with patent
infringement claims. Alternatively, the "reasonable duty" examined under
traditional legal malpractice standards maybe unpredictable in application,
placing the burden on the client to prove neglect of a "reasonable duty" in
an area lacking precedent and guidance. The strict liability standard and
the "reasonable duty" standard represent two ends of an imperfect
spectrum to determine whether the attorney has committed malpractice
and indicate the need for a more nuanced standard.
Thus, it would be ill-advised for a court, in an attorney-advised patent
infringement malpractice suit, to hold (1) that a client failed to establish
that an attorney neglected a "reasonable duty" if the client was held liable

210. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2007).
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for patent infringement; or (2) that the attorney was strictly liable based on
the outcome of a patent infringement lawsuit where the attorney was not
a party. Legal malpractice suits based on attorney-advised tax patent
infringement involve complex issues at the intersection of traditional
malpractice notions and the standards for establishing patent infringement,
and therefore should involve a nuanced analysis to balance the competing
interests.
b. The Malpractice Presumption for Attorney Advised
Patent Infringement
Assuming a court holds a client liable for infringement of a tax patent
based on the advice of an attorney, a rebuttable presumption that
malpractice occurred should apply against the tax attorney. The attorney
could rebut the presumption by establishing that: (1) the client deviated
from the attorney's advice in any manner; (2) the client knew of the tax
patent and failed to disclose the patent to the attorney; or (3) the attorney
took reasonable measures to ensure that the tax strategy was not patented.
Admittedly, the reasonableness of the attorney's actions would require
new interpretations of the level of research required by a tax attorney
whose work may now involve an injection of patent law. However, the
burden would be on the attorney to rebut the presumption of malpractice,
as opposed to the burden on the client to prove malpractice.
This presumption would shift the existing malpractice burden that is
placed upon the client. In theory, the client would have already satisfied
this "burden" by being held liable for patent infringement, and thus the
burden would shift to the attorney in the form of a rebuttable presumption
of malpractice. Accordingly, if the attorney could not rebut the
presumption, the attorney would be held liable for malpractice for advising
the client in an action that resulted in patent infringement. This
presumption would simultaneously create a heightened standard for
malpractice by placing the initial burden on the attorney and avoiding the
draconian strict liability standard.
C. Discussion with Robert Slane, the Inventor of the SOGRAT Patent
On September 18,2008, the author conducted an interview with Robert
Slane, the inventor of the SOGRAT patent, and president of Wealth
Transfer.2 1' The subject of the interview was Slane's view on the
211. Telephone interview with Robert Slane, Wealth Transfer Group, LLC, in Maitland, Fla.
(Sept. 18, 2008).
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requirement that tax attorneys should research tax patents and his general
commentary on the emergence of tax patents.2 12 Slane qualified all of his
remarks by reiterating that he was not an attorney, was unaware of what
specific ethical standards applied to attorneys, and did not know how to
interpret those standards. 213 As a patent holder, Slane explained that
holding a tax patent would no more influence a tax attorney's advice than
would an unpatented strategy that a tax attorney had frequently used in
practice. 2 14 Using the example of a right-handed basketball player who is
accustomed to dribbling with his right hand, Slane noted that all
practitioners become habituated to certain techniques they have utilized
frequently in their careers. 2 15 He did not believe that tax patents created
any additional conflict of interest because the teeth of patent laws lay in
the exclusionary rights of the patent, not the promotion of the patent
holder's use of the patent.2 16
Furthermore, Slane believed that attorneys' failures to disclose tax
patents had increased. Certain attorneys would neither inform their clients
of the SOGRAT patent nor present their clients with the choice of using
the SOGRAT patent.21 7 Moreover, tax attorneys had personally told Slane
that they would intentionally infringe upon the SOGRAT patent, as the
attorneys did not feel that the patent was valid and enforceable.2 18 Also,
attorneys had told him that they intentionally directed clients away from
the SOGRAT patent to avoid having to compensate Slane.219
Ultimately, Slane did not feel that patenting tax strategies altered the
ethical or professional requirements of tax practitioners.2 20 Slane believed
that all tax practitioners should be responsible for searching the USPTO
before dispensing tax advice and that this undertaking would not be
difficult due to the ease of navigating the USPTO website.22 1 Slane

212. See id.
213. See id. (He added that he did not attend law school, does not hold himself out as an
attorney, and does not represent to clients that he understands all of the legal aspects of estate
planning-candidly opining that "per stirpes means nothing to me!"). Id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
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concluded by explaining that as tax strategies adapt to changing
conditions, so must the tax practitioners employing these strategies.22 2
VII. CONCLUSION
For more than two hundred years tax strategies were unpatentable and
considered to be abstract ideas or algorithms, outside of the realm of
statutory subject matter. However, the landmark decision in State Street
abrogated the "business method" exception to patentable subject matter
and opened the door to tax patents.223 In 2003, the USPTO issued the
SOGRAT patent, which detailed a nonqualified stock option grantor
retained annuity trust. 224 Although the SOGRAT patent was challenged on
the grounds of invalidity and unenforceability, the case settled out of court,
and the SOGRAT patent maintains its statutory presumption of validity.225
To date, a court has not ruled whether the SOGRAT, or any structurebased tax patent, is valid and enforceable. These structure-based patents
will likely be challenged for failing to meet the statutory requirement of
a patentable process under the machine-or-transformation test reaffirmed
by Bilski, or the novelty and nonobviousness requirements. Tax attorneys
argue that these "patented loopholes" 226 were being utilized by tax
attorneys long before tax strategies were patentable. Alternatively,
Congress may intervene and either bar structure-based tax patents, or
severely curtail damages for patent infringement before a federal court can
rule on the validity of structure-based tax patents.
The emergence and ongoing validity of tax patents highlights a number
of uncertainties in the ethical requirements of tax attorneys and the
standard for establishing legal malpractice. Based on the absence of
guidance in the ABA Model Rules, this Note suggested two approaches to
apply in two distinct scenarios of potential ethical violations and legal
malpractice.

222. Id.
223. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
224. See U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed May 20, 2003).
225. Consent Final Judgment Regarding Settlement Agreement at 1, Wealth Transfer Group,
L.L.C. v. John W. Rowe, No. 3:06CV0024 (D. Conn. 2007).
226. See William A. Drennan, The PatentedLoophole:How Should CongressRespond to this
JudicialInvention, 59 FLA. L. REv. 229 (2007) (positing that Congress should prohibit tax patent
holders from collecting damages for patent infringement based on the amount of taxes saved by use
of the patented process).
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The first approach would apply to tax attorneys who prepare tax
strategies and have knowledge of the SOGRAT patent, or another
applicable structure-based tax patent, and fail to disclose the presence of
the patent to the client. The law is unclear as to whether the attorney has
to disclose the patent. This Note suggests that courts refrain from a bright
line rule and engage instead in a highly factual judicial incursion of the
underlying transaction - examining the sophistication of the client, the
complexity of the transaction, and the attorney's alternative suggestion for
the disposition of the client's assets. This analysis would permit the court
to determine whether the failure to disclose precluded the client from
making a reasonably informed decision. If the court finds that the
attorney's failure to disclose a tax patent precluded the client from making
a reasonably informed decision and resulted in a loss to the client, then the
attorney should be held liable for legal malpractice.
The second approach would apply to a tax attorneys who unknowingly
provide infringing advice to a client as a result of a failure to locate a tax
patent. Under this scenario, the attorney may be able to hide behind a
shield of ignorance that precludes infringement liability for inducement,
and leaves the liability of direct infringement on the innocent client who
followed the attorney's advice. Due to the different standards for
establishing patent infringement and legal malpractice, a client could be
held liable for patent infringement, while the attorney escapes liability for
legal malpractice. To address the potential inconsistency, this Note
suggests the adoption of a rebuttable malpractice presumption against the
attorney who provided the infringing advice.
This malpractice presumption would transform the client's burden of
proving malpractice to the attorney's burden of disproving malpractice, or
rebutting the presumption. In the absence of precedent, a client's
malpractice claim may prove difficult to establish based on the recent
intrusion of intellectual property law into the field of estate planning.
Thus, with the malpractice presumption predicated on a finding of liability
against the client in the underlying patent infringement suit, the burden
will shift to the attorney to establish that the attorney took reasonable
measures before unknowingly dispensing patent infringing advice.
Implementation of the malpractice presumption would assist a court
assessing the interplay of legal malpractice standards and patent
infringement standards and effectively prevent a patently troublesome
double standard for the liable client and advising attorney.
With the presence of structure-based tax patents looming over the field
of federal tax law, certain issues will unfold as two historically distinct
areas of the law inevitably clash. Although the advent of structure-based

188

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20

tax patents creates situations that strive for clarity, these nascent issues
have not been addressed by the ABA Model Rules or judiciaries, and may
prove troublesome to clients attempting to establish malpractice and tax
practitioners unfamiliar with intellectual property law. Accordingly, this
Note proposes recommendations intended to address the emerging issues
that will arise as a result of the proliferation and enforcement of structurebased tax patents.

